Physical Literacy

The value of physical education in the curriculum is characteristically assessed from a predominantly dualistic position that tends to view our bodily aspect as of only comparatively minor importance. Consideration of this human dimension is viewed as only dubiously appropriate in education. At best it is tolerated on the ground that certain forms of exercise can be relaxing or invigorating and so enhance performance in the key sphere of cognitive endeavour.

However, when the fact of our embodiment is examined from a less dualistic position-particularly by some existentialists and phenomenologists-a very different picture emerges. From this perspective our bodily dimension is integrally involved in most aspects of our existence-not least in the establishment of a meaningful relation- ship with the world around us. Taken from this viewpoint our body and its motility can be seen to have an equal claim for attention in education alongside our other attributes which give life its meaning.

Philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre support a central role for the body in existence. While they hold very different views on a range of issues, there is agreement that man is 'being-in-the-world'. His existence is realised and sustained in intimate relationship with the world. As Merleau-Ponty says, "We are through and through compounded of relationships with the world" [1]. And this 'world' which is essential to life as we know it, is not to be viewed merely as a neutral milieu involved only in objective support services such as the provision of oxygen and food. It is the basis for all human capacities and the ground of the significances man finds in his life experiences.

Following from this view is a recognition of the fundamental role played by all those human attributes that enable us to be in contact with the world. These attributes provide us with access to our milieu and afford us the interaction that is essential for us to realise a meaningful existence. Each attribute has a unique contribution to make, and among these is included our body-that aspect of ourself that enables us to relate to, and make sense of, our concrete surroundings. Both philosophers see the body as of fundamental importance in our interaction with the world. Merleau-Ponty says that "Neither the body nor existence can be regarded as the original of human being since they presuppose each other, and because the body is solidified and generalised existence, and existence is perpetual incarnation" [2]. Similarly, Sartre is of the opinion that "the very nature of the for-itself demands that it be body" [3].

Our nature as embodied, with the opportunities for interaction this gives rise to, has a significant effect on the totality of our relationship with our surroundings. Indeed, this could be described as characteristically an 'embodied relationship'. By this is meant both that an individual's understanding of the world is developed, necessarily, from the standpoint of his own embodiment, and that his appreciation of himself is embued with aspects of his own physicality.

Our embodiment affords us to two almost inseparable modes of contact, actional and perceptual. Our bodily aspect responds through movement to the requirements of our surroundings and is also perceptually sensitive to the nature of this environment. Merleau-Ponty identifies this perceptual role in the way that objects have meaning for us in respect of how they can be related to, physically. In line with his view that perception is intentionality in operation, he ascribes to our motile capacities a particular mode of intentionality. This he calls 'operative' intentionality and goes on to propose for it a significant role in the totality of our intentional nature. He suggests that "Beneath the 'intentionality of the act' which is the thetic consciousness of an object, and which ... for example, converts 'this' into an idea, we must recognize an 'operative' intentionality which makes the former possible" [4].

Our motility, then, plays a part in giving meaning to objects and this could be called their 'operative meaning'. Unlike visually initiated meanings which have been crystalised in terms of colour, size and shape, operative meanings have not acquired verbal labels. The only way operative meaning can be expressed is in terms of how our motility would need to be deployed to relate, with ease, to the object or feature in question. Operative meaning could be described, rather awkwardly, as the blend and range of movements that could affect the establishment of a satisfactory and profitable practical relationship with that object.

This meaning corresponds to an operative potential in the perceiving individual. When actual interaction occurs there is, at one and the same time, a reaffirmation of the operative meaning of the object, and an actualisation of a mode of the individual's motile capacity. In existence viewed essentially as continuous liaison with the world, this interaction could be identified as 'operative liaison'. As is the case of any liaison, a two-fold enrichment takes place: our appreciation of our surroundings, and our realisation of our capacities.

That we can interact effectively with our concrete surroundings is evidenced in many of our everyday routines, but operative liaison has tended to be overlooked in our continuous interaction with the world. There are two reasons for this. The first is the synaesthetic nature of perception. This results in interaction with aspects of our surroundings being with them as 'totalities' (the sum total of their meaning as derived from all our perceptual centres). In the 'wholes' perceived, the contribution from each perceptual centre is not necessarily apparent as such, and attributes 'perceived' by one centre may be presumed to derive from another. The second is that within the perception of 'wholes' some facets of meaning are achieved almost without reflective attention and thus are readily overlooked. Operative meaning suffers in both these ways, and though more often than not a constituent of perception, it is habitually disregarded.

Because operative meaning and operative liaison have been overlooked, their significance has been neglected both in their contribution to perception as a whole, and in their potential for developing a unique form of interaction with the world. This is unfortunate given the significant role that this mode of liaison can be seen to play. For example, Merleau-Ponty explains: " ... my organism, as a prepersonal cleaving to the general form of the world ... plays beneath my personal life, the part of an inborn complex. It is not some inert kind of thing, it too has something of the momentum of existence" [5]. And, again: "Our bodily experience of movement ... provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with a 'praktognosia' which has to be recognised as original and perhaps as primary" [6].

If existence is essentially a dialogue with our surroundings, it follows that its quality will be enriched in so far as this interaction is fostered. This, in turn, provides a particular perspective on what might be the concerns of education, and results in a position similar to that advocated by the Ancient Greeks. In their conception of liberal education every aspect of the individual's natural ability was to be fostered. Their guiding principle was "not individualism but 'humanism', to use the word in its original and classical sense. It meant the process of educating man into his true form, the real and genuine human nature" [7]. The role of education was to release "the powers of the young soul" [8]. and to achieve arete. Were education today to adopt a similar position a radical change in the curriculum would result. The very specific focus on intellectual development would give way to a much broader programme, where fostering intellectual abilities would be only one of a whole range of activities designed to enrich our interaction with the world.

The development of each mode of interaction would open up new areas of experience which would add to the quality and vitality of life. These last would be achieved by a greater awareness both of the richness of our surroundings and of the wealth of our capacities. Together these would encourage appreciation, humility, self- confidence and self-esteem. Within this broader perspective physical education would clearly have a specific role to play. It would be responsible for nurturing a particular aspect of our interaction with the world. In doing this it would enrich appreciation both of our surroundings and of our capacities as embodied beings. It would thus enable us to realise a fundamental aspect of our humanness.

This perception of the potential of the subject has not, in the main, been appreciated by physical educationists. Sources of justification have ranged between somewhat spurious claims in non-physical areas to very specific goals in a physiological or anatomical/mechanical context. The first approach is regrettable, not least because it omits to highlight the unique nature of the subject, and the second has the disadvantage of appearing to promote the reification of the body. This latter is an attitude few physical educationists would want to promote, as they see their subject as concerned with the development of the whole child, not just the bodily aspects.

Some evidence of an awareness of a more subtle and significant role for physical education can, however, be found from time to time in the history of the subject. Vittorino in fifteenth century Italy and Montaigne in sixteenth century Rome, as well as Leibniz and Rousseau, have alluded to the fundamental importance of developing our motility. More recently, Kleinman proposed that physical education should aim "to develop an awareness of bodily being in the world", and " ... enable one, ultimately, to create on his own an experience through movement which culminates in meaningful, purposeful realisation of self" [9].

This experience of self-realisation occurs most intensely, if rather surprisingly, in situations where operative liaison is so fluent that the individual pays less, rather than more, attention to the detailed manipulation of his body. His embodiment is caught up in his total involvement in the situation. The interaction almost 'absorbs' his motility in the close liaison that develops. The embodiment in itself is "passed by in silence" [10]. and is lived pre-reflectively in the mode referred to by Sartre as the 'body-for-itself'. This body is " ... nothing other than the for-itself, it is not an in-itself in the for-itself" [11]. Merleau-Ponty calls this the 'phenomenal' body or the 'lived' body. Both philosophers see this mode of living our embodiment as our natural and habitual mode, and anticipate a range of potential problems in focusing too specifi-cally on the embodiment as a pure object or instrument. (These are important considerations for physical educationists and warrant further investigation.) It is perhaps hard for those concerned with improving aspects of our physical attributes to accept that their ultimate goal is to enable pupils to disregard the complexities of bodily control and co-ordination in the pursuance of a close and articulate liaison with the world. The real value of the capacities of our embodied dimension is not realised in isolation from our surroundings but in intimate relationship with them.

There has, however, been an intuitive appreciation of the importance of achieving this close liaison, with its accompanying sense of fulfillment, in the persistence by physical educationists to cite 'enjoyment' as one of the major aims of the subject. Unfortunately the attempt to identify this as a prime objective of physical education has been counter-productive, as the promotion of enjoyment or pleasure per se is not normally regarded as of educational value. Any subject that bases its case for inclusion in the school curriculum principally on this ground is liable to be excluded from education altogether, or at best relegated to extra-curricular recreational programmes. The hedonistic justification is particularly unfortunate because physical education already tends to be identified with leisure activities, as 'purely for fun'. Furthermore, appeal to the idea of pleasure does not identify the unique feature that physical education has to offer.

Whilst it is not improper to hope that pupils will get pleasure from engaging in physical education-and indeed this is a goal of all teachers in every subject-to place emphasis on pleasure rather than on engagement or mastery reveals a misunderstand-ing of the relationship between the two. Pleasure usually accompanies an experience of a particular nature; it is not a 'free standing' phenomenon. Aristotle's account of pleasure [12] as identical with successful activity, or as the crown or consummation of successful activity, is applicable to physical activity. The pleasure, as completing a particular activity or as concomitant with it, is peculiar to that activity and thus has its own distinctive character. Hence, it is legitimate to claim that there is a unique satisfaction to be gained from effective participation in physical activity, but it is a mistake to give the impression that pleasure is to be promoted in itself. To do this trivialises the enterprise, bringing it down to the level of an amusement.

It is salutary to reflect that while all other subjects could offer the pleasure concomitant with mastery of their specific activity, as a goal in their work, they do not do so. Far from resting their case on this goal they seldom mention it, emphasising instead values specific to their subject. Physical educationists, virtually alone among teachers, persist in attempting to justify their subject hedonistically. They are, it would seem, attempting to identify the nature of the experience achieved in close liaison with the world. This is an experience familiar to them as able sportspeople. They have indeed found physical activity profoundly fulfilling and pleasurable, a rich source of self-awareness and self-assurance. Without reflective understanding of the nature of the interaction that takes place in physical activity between themselves and their physical surroundings, there is nothing for them to identify as the intrinsic value of physical activity except pure pleasure. Without this understanding there appears to be two separate phenomena-their active involvement in, for example, a game, and the deep satisfaction they get from it, with nothing more than a simple causal relationship between the two. In their view that pleasure per se is their ultimate goal, they leave themselves with no defence against those who reason that if pupils get more pleasure from chemistry than physical activity they should devote their time to the former rather than the latter. Physical educationists have responded to this threat by pro- pounding a whole range of extrinsic justifications, such as moral development, even in extreme cases construing physical education as a form of knowledge or a form of art. Yet they are still reluctant to abandon the hedonistic justification, and continue to emphasise it, despite the disservice it does to their case. It seems to them essential because citing it is the closest they can get to identifying what could be seen as the real intrinsic value of physical activity.

What they are really so concerned to cite they are incapable of articulating, namely the achievement of successful liaison with the world via their embodied dimension; or to be exact, between their motile embodiment and the concrete features of the world. It is certainly true that a particular pleasure accompanies this liaison. This can be explained as a particular experience of harmony in two dimensions. One arises from the apprehension of all capacities of the embodiment collaborating to a single purpose. This carries with it an exhilarating sense of power, or elan vital, working within the individual. There is a 'centring' of all the physical attributes into a disciplined but dynamic whole. The other experience of harmony accompanies the first and results from the embodiment's being 'in tune' with the surrounding forces of the world. Such is the degree of intimacy here that the individual no longer has a sense of being 'over and against' the world but rather there is an experience of a sort of unity, with the forces of his embodiment and those of the world, as it were, contributing to a common end. There is at one and the same time a sense of identification with the world and an experience of confidence in oneself. This simulta-neous illumination of the individual as embodied, and of the world, in its reciprocity with the embodiment, is no doubt an instance of fully lived operative intentionality, an intentional intimacy of the order described by Merleau-Ponty as 'chiasm'. Such an experience has profound significance for the individual. Not only does it carry affirmation of the competence with which he can use his embodied dimension, it also tends to bring to his awareness his fundamental nature as being embodied-in-the- world. And, since during such an experience the individual is at once at home with himself and at home in the world, it may justly be regarded as an experience of freedom, and is typically recognised as such.

To experience this sense of liberation from the physical constraints that usually reduce the effectiveness of our movement, coupled with a sense of assurance in our embodied capacities is indeed pleasurable. But the real value of physical education does not lie in this pleasure. It lies in the development of a specific mode of relating to the world. This involves building from the pre-reflective operation of the embodiment that provides the essential ground for our interaction with the world, towards an ever more articulate operative liaison-one that is not lived with the usual casual presump-tion, but in which the mover is acutely aware of the totality of his embodiment in its reciprocal interaction with the patterns of force and resistance in the world. The mover's attention is captivated by the effective and powerful sensitivity of his embodiment. This is not to imply that the embodiment, in these situations, is operating under especially precise and deliberate conscious control. The patterning of motility may be no more under such control than it is in the more routine movements of everyday life. Indeed, if particularly acute conscious control were operating it would be impossible for the individual to appreciate his liaison in its essential totality. As in all operative liaison, it is the pre-reflective lived embodiment that interacts with the world. What occurs in really articulate liaison is that the mover is unusually conscious of his intimate relationship with his concrete surroundings. Within this apparent 'fusion' he is, as it were, living his embodiment simultaneously on two levels-the pre- reflective and the reflective.

It should not be forgotten that the embodied faculties that are at work in highly articulate interaction are also responsible for our everyday operative liaison. The perceptual and motile powers of the embodiment that underpin routine movements concerned with such operations as walking, dressing, packing a suitcase and swatting a wasp, are also those which enable someone to participate successfully in what would be recognised as outstanding achievements in the 'physical' sphere such as white water canoeing, high diving and mountain climbing, and indeed in supreme physical accomplishments outside sport, as in war situations and highly precarious feats in the face of great danger. There seems in everyday life a sort of minimum level of use of these powers (a level that western civilization appears determined to reduce still more). They operate from within their already established perceptual and motile capacities and are neither challenged nor stretched in any way. The range of liaison patterns required is restricted and the same embodied capacities are repeatedly drawn on. For example, the supporting surface is even and firm, movement is predominantly forwards and on a medium level, and objects can always be positioned within easy reach. The embodiment can remain upright and loads are seldom of great weight. While the perceptual and motile powers of the embodiment will be continually in action during our waking hours, they will seldom be called on to respond with particular speed or precision or to effect interaction from anything but a sitting or standing position. But these powers have latent capacities that might well go unsus-pected in their rarely extended routine operation. The embodied faculties can function with acute sensitivity and fluent versatility to achieve effective liaison in situations where speed, accuracy, co-ordination and control are of great importance. Successful interaction can also be achieved in less usual spatial orientations, in a wide range of challenging contexts and in highly unpredictable settings.

The aim of physical education is to develop these embodied faculties to enable pupils to achieve effective liaison in progressively more complex and demanding situations. This development must build from pupils' present level of articulacy. Any increase in sensitivity or motility can only be a refinement of existing capacities-a gradual development of innate powers. Notions of comparison with others or reaching of prescribed standards are out of place. Progress and success must always be judged in relation to each individual's current ability. What is important for the individual is the extension and enrichment of his routine operative liaison towards a goal of more versatile, articulate and significant interaction.

This development of innate human powers from their habitual use to their refined and sophisticated use is exactly parallel to the concerns of intellectual education. Here certain mental capacities are nurtured and challenged to operate in progressively more complex and demanding contexts. This can be exemplified in the development of our powers of imagination. Imagination, it is proposed, relies on our ability to make associations and synthesise ideas. These capacities "are the basis of our existence as thinking beings" [13], enabling us, for example, to construct and understand simple sentences. However, it is these same powers, much refined and developed, that give rise to imaginative endeavour of the highest order, such as the formation of hypotheses leading to the unification of different branches of science or the creation of a symphony.

The development of both embodied and intellectual faculties also share the capacity to enhance an individual's self-awareness and self-esteem. In fostering em-bodied faculties a closer relationship with our concrete surroundings is achieved. As a result, we come to realise the extent of these faculties and appreciate more fully the aspects of the world with which they interact. In other words, we have a sense of 'being-at-home' in the physical world and an awareness of our effective relationship with that world. This experience gives rise to a growth in confidence in our embodied capabilities and thus in general self-confidence. Likewise in the intellectual sphere, developing competence in using, for example, mathematical concepts and formulae, gives the individual a sense of 'being-at-home' in the subject area of mathematics. He operates with increasing ease in the area and has an appreciation of his growing mastery. Again the realisation of effectiveness promotes a sense of self-confidence. The fostering of our innate intellectual powers and the subsequent growth of self-assurance is seen to be of value, and there seems no reason why similar growth of the embodied faculties should not be viewed in the same way. Both contribute to the development of distinctly human capacities, thus enriching existence and promoting self-fulfillment.

What counts as 'development' in both of these areas is similar and includes attention to depth and breadth. It includes an increase in awareness and appreciation; progress towards mastery and progress towards the understanding of the fundamentals of the area. But there must also be a wider understanding, a grasp of the extent of the area. Both types of capacities have numerous facets that can be fostered singly or in various combinations. Intellectual faculties encompass abilities in the spheres of mathematics, linguistics, chemistry, ethics and the arts-to name but a few. Embodied faculties include abilities specifically related to effective liaison in a variety of situations; for example, in rapidly changing and unpredictable contexts, and those involving surmounting obstacles, projecting missiles or propelling oneself through space. Just as it would be very dubious to call someone 'intellectually educated' if he had reached a sophisticated level of confidence in just one sphere such as mathema-tics, and had very minimal competence in other fields, it would be unacceptable to consider an individual 'physically educated' if he was highly skilled in one athletic event, such as the pole vault, but had paid scant attention to developing skill in any other physical activity.

The arguments put forward for breadth in the intellectual sphere hold true for that of the embodiment. Peters, for example, sees an educated person as one whose breadth of understanding enables him to "connect up these different ways of interpreting his experience so that he achieves some kind of cognitive perspective" [14]. This does not imply that he views all situations from, for example, a purely mathematical perspec-tive, but rather that his 'mathematical appreciation' of the world plays a part in his understanding, alongside other modes of viewing the world. In this way he can appreciate more fully the complexities of his environment. In a parallel sense, to achieve a dialectic with, and understanding of, the concrete world, the individual needs to develop a range of his embodied capacities. Someone who had concentrated all his energies into improving his capacity as a weight lifter would lack the sensitive versatility to relate closely with very many aspects of his surroundings. Narrow specialisation is often referred to as 'training' -and indeed the weight lifter would agree with Peters here in describing his specialised physical skills as resulting from 'training' rather than 'educating'.

Ironically, Peters's claim that "the saying that 'education of the whole man' is a conceptual truth in that being educated is incompatible with being narrowly special-ised" [15] exposes the inadequacy of the predominant current view of education as to do with developing the mind. If education is to be 'of the whole man' it will have to be concerned with all those human faculties that enable man to 'hold on to the world', to use Merleau-Ponty's expression; that is all those fundamental powers that promote man's characteristic intentional existence as embodied-being-in-the-world. Man's em-bodied faculties are a mode of access to external being with which we interact to create a meaningful existence. They would need to be developed alongside the intellectual and other faculties if pupils are to achieve a balanced development and undergo an education which is not seriously defective.

This, however, is too modest a claim. As Merleau-Ponty reveals, perceptual capacities underpin all intellectual capacities. "The perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence" [16]. The primacy of perception indicates that human capacities concerned with perception have a prior claim to development, for without the product of these sensitivities cognition has no basis; "we can only think the world because we have already experienced it" [17]. As providing a fundamental constituent of perception, our embodied capacities therefore warrant serious attention throughout education. And there is no indication in Merleau-Ponty's work that these sensitivities of the embodi-ment are in any way of less value than our other modes of access to the world. Rather, the reverse is the case. The operative aspects of our intentional relationship with the world are frequently described as the ground of this interaction. He writes, "We found beneath the intentionality of acts, or thetic intentionality, another kind which is the condition of the former's possibility: namely an operative intentionality already at work before any positing or any judgement, a 'logos of the aesthetic world', an 'art hidden in the depth of the human soul', one which like any art, is known only by its results" [18]. More specifically, he claims that it is motility in its pure state that "possesses the basic power of giving a meaning" [19].

This view of the nature of human experience renders suspect an education based solely on intellectual development. It is not acceptable for intellectualists, such as P. H. Hirst, to say that their view of education neither needs to be, nor in fact is, based on a metaphysic [20]. To recommend an education without reference to the nature of its subjects is extraordinarily arbitrary, if not irrational. And despite their declared intention to reject metaphysics, they in effect adopt the traditional view of human being as essentially rational, and so put enormous emphasis upon propositional knowledge. What they call 'liberal education', to which they allot a built-in priority in the curriculum, is precisely the education of what they take to be essentially human in the pupils. (It is this metaphysical presupposition which saves their position from being merely, i.e. senselessly, arbitrary.) But as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty empha-sise, man's essential being is not confined to his rationality. Man is 'being-in-the- world', interacting with the world on a series of levels, across a wide variety of dimensions, and having its roots in the pre-conceptual experience of perceptual liaison with the world. This view by no means denies even great importance to the rational intellect, but it does not begin by granting it an a priori superiority over every other mode of human being, and it does not to seek to separate it from these other modes out of which it issues and with which it remains intertwined.

Our embodied faculties, being at the heart of perception and thus providing the essential foundation for all that we call 'intellectual', have a very strong claim to be a central concern in education. To belittle or neglect our embodied dimension is therefore an expression of contempt for the ground of educational endeavour, and a denial of our essential nature, the very foundation of our multifarious existence in the world. The intellectualists' perception of the promotion of explicit cognition and rationality as the basis for all other human development is superficial, and the onus is on them to argue through their case for granting such large and privileged access to the curriculum for their various 'forms of knowledge', rather than allow it to rest prematurely upon an unreflected ground.

There is perhaps one line of argument that they could adopt. While accepting the fundamental role of the perceptual and actional capacities of the embodiment, they could claim that attention need only be paid to them in so far as this is necessary for other modes of development to take place. Physical education would be retained for the instrumental contribution it made to education, but, having no independent value, it would need only minimal time devoted to its study. Implicit here would be the view that the development of embodied powers (and thus embodied liaison) was not in itself a valuable project. Such an attitude to our embodiment would be insensitive, however, and it is hard not to see it as based upon prejudice against the body.

Far from being inferior instrumental capacities, our embodied powers are central to existence in their fundamental role in giving meaning to the world. It is surprising that, along with other intellectualists, R. S. Peters should overlook these bodily powers, given his view that reverence is an appropriate attitude towards those human capacities shared by all normal individuals which, as the foundation of public traditions, have given structure and coherence to the world [21]. He argues further that the world into which we are initiated in our youth represents "centuries of effort by our ancestors" [22] and that we should regard this world with reverence, taking our place with appropriate humility in our "shared inheritance" [23]. He extends this respect to 'public traditions' also, through which the world as a cultural product is constituted. He describes the sciences as "perhaps the finest product that yet exists of the sustained and controlled imagination of the human race" [24] and as "the supreme example of reason in action" [25] Peters acknowledges that the shared world has been created "through our perceptual apparatus" [26], and that the sciences, for example have their basis in agreement in shared observational judgements through which they are able to acquire the high degree of objectivity that is characteristic of them. Other forms of knowledge such as aesthetics, morals and religion, rest upon what he calls "shared responses" [27] and "common reactions drawing from a shared human nature" [28], by which he means the same or similar feelings on contemplating the same objects or situations. These aspects of our contingency-common perceptions and shared responses-in their ability to enable us to "make some sort of sense of the world" [29] are regarded as worthy of respect. This respect does not extend, however, to our embodied capacities, which Peters ignores. Yet what we call 'the world' has its ground in our embodied relationship to external being, and neither language in general, including the forms of knowledge, nor even perception itself, in any but the most primitive sense at best, would be possible without our bodily capacities, includ-ing the capacities to manipulate things and those various capacities which we describe collectively and very inadequately as 'the powers of movement'.

It is surprising that being so much in agreement with Merleau-Ponty as to the nature of being in general, Peters should disregard aspects of being which Merleau- Ponty identifies as an essential ground of the world. Merleau-Ponty argues, for example, that we have "to acknowledge an imposition of meaning which is not the work of a constituting consciousness" [30]. He identifies the body as the medium through which we have a world, and motility as possessing the basic power of attributing meaning. Our embodiment is the first and most fundamental key to the world, enabling us to relate to it, make sense of it and adapt it largely to our design. Since the nature of the world in which we live and its further development and enrichment rests on our embodied capacities one would have thought that they were at least as worthy of awe and respect as any of our other capacities.

There is another sense in which Peters should have acknowledged aspects of our embodied capacities as being of value. Just as the forms of knowledge 'make sense' of aspects of our existence, our motile ability or physical adeptness enables us to come to terms with and give meaning to the world. Where the thorough grasp of a form of knowledge opens up new avenues of experience and a corresponding enrichment of our interaction with the world, the development of our physical capacities opens up new possibilities of experience and offers an extension of our understanding of a particular aspect of the world. Both forms of knowledge and our motility are modes of access to the world, means by which we can become more 'at home in the world'. Had Peters looked more broadly at the totality our relationship with the world, or had he examined in depth Morris' view, to which he ascribed, "that education consists in the discovery of what it means to be human" [31], he might not have been tempted to interpret man's creativity and achievements in so narrowly intellectual a way as he did. Then, far from ignoring the bodily dimension of human nature, he might have joined Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty in their profound respect for its powers, achieve-ments and potentialities.

One might ask why the powers of our embodiment have attracted so little attention. Why are they thought to differ so radically from other abilities, the development of which is readily assumed to be of value and an end in itself? Is it perhaps that activities pertaining to this dimension of our human condition in some way fall short of criteria generally used to define 'worthwhileness'? These criteria though variously expressed, usually centre around the following notions: firstly, an activity is seen as worthwhile if there is the possibility that it can be practised "with more or less skill, sensitivity and understanding" [32]; secondly, that it has the capacity to challenge and absorb an individual in providing "unending opportunities for skill and discrimination" [33]; thirdly, that its participants show respect and care for the standards inherent in its operation, and, finally, that it is pursued purely for its own sake, for the satisfaction it gives to the participant. These criteria are normally used to describe involvement in activities such as the study of archaeology, biochemis-try or linguistics. However, activities focused on exploring and extending a particular mode of operative liaison such as team games or sailing have no difficulty in satisfying these same criteria. Sailing, for example, can be carried out with degrees of 'skill, sensitivity and understanding'; it undoubtedly offers unending challenges to the participants, who in their turn show care and respect for the standards and conven-tions of its practices. And it is pursued for its own sake, in giving individuals the satisfaction of having extended their capacities and achieved an effective liaison with their surroundings.

That 'movement based' experiences are indeed viewed as worthwhile is evident in the incidence in many cultures, not least that of Great Britain, of a wide range of physical activities such as sport and dance. Participation in these is an important part of the lives of very many people. There is a sense in which these individuals want to go beyond simply deploying their embodiment to purely utilitarian ends. There is a desire to take part in activities that enable them to reaffirm their fundamental nature as embodied, to create a harmonious dialogue with the forces of the world, and to take delight in the sensitivity and versatility of their motility-in short, to proclaim and celebrate the being and capabilities of their embodiment.

It is perhaps because the embodiment is something of a mystery in its subtle, yet pervasive role in existence, that the intellectualist finds it difficult to come to terms with. In its pre-reflective operation in both routine and supremely demanding operative liaison it does not require continuous detailed control and monitoring by consciousness. It attributes meaning, gives coherence and rises to the occasion with uncanny acuity. Its functioning almost defies explanation. Our embodiment is indeed an "art hidden in the depths of the human soul" [34], a "great intelligence" [35] that evades, perplexes and perhaps humiliates the intellectualist, so that he reacts to the thoughts of it with ridicule or cursory dismissal, or at best by assigning it some strictly subordinate place and function. Yet the powers of the intellect are equally mysterious in their origins and operations [36].

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968) Phenomenology of Perception (Rout ledge & Kegan Paul), p. Xlll. [2] Ibid., p. 166.

[3] J-P. SARTRE (1943) Being and Nothingness (London, Methuen: 1969 paperback), p. 309. [4] M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968) op. cit., p. 418.

[5] Ibid., p. 84.

[6] Ibid., p. 140.

[7] W. JEAGER (1939) Paideia (Oxford, Blackwell), p. xxiii. [8] Ibid., p. 29.

[9] S. KLEINMAN (1964) The significance of human movement: a phenomenological approach, in: E. W.

GERBER & W. J. MORGAN (Eds) (1979) Sport and the Body (Philadelphia, Lea & Febiger), p. 179. [10] J-P. SATRE (1943) op. cit., p. 330.

[11] Ibid., p. 309.

[12] ARISTOTLE (1963) Ethics, Book X (London, Dent).

[13] R. K. ELLlOIT (1975) Imagination: 'a kind of magical faculty' (University of Birmingham), p. 10.

[14] R. S. PETERS (1973) The justification of education, in: R. S. PETERS (Ed.) The Philosophy of Education, p.240.

[15] R. S. PETERS (1970) Education and the educated man, Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. iv, Jan 1970 p. 6.

[16] M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1947) The primacy of perception, in: The Primacy oJ Perception (Northwestern

University Press, 1964), p. 13. [17] Ibid., p. 17.

[18] M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968) op. cit., p. 429. [19] Ibid., p. 142.

Meaningful Existence, Embodiment and Physical Education 13

[20] For a detailed consideration of this issue see R. T. ALLEN (1990) Metaphysics in education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vo!. 23. No. 2.

[21] R. S. PETERS (1974) Subjectivity and standards, in: Psychology and Ethical Development (London, George Alien & Unwin) (1974), p. 421 and p. 425. cf. M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968) op. cit., pp. xvi, xvii, xx.

[22] R. S. PETERS (1974) op. cit., p. 423.

[23] Ibid., p. 423, also p. 420 and p. 427. See also R. S. PETERS (1972) Reason and Morality and Religion

(Friends Home Service Committee), p. 67 and p. 96. [24] R. S. PETERS (1974) op. cit., p. 421.

[25] Ibid., p. 424.

[26] Ibid., p. 414.

[27] Ibid., p. 417.

[28] R. S. PETERS (1972) op. cit., p. 80. See also p. 76 and p. 97. cf. M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968) op. cit., p. xx

and p. 353.

[29] R. S. PETERS (1972) op. cit., p. 87. cf. M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968) op. cit., p. 363. [30] M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968 op. cit., p. 147.

[3]] R. S. PETERS (1974) op. cit., p. 414.

[32] R. S. PETERS (1973) op. cit., p. 248.

[33] Ibid., p. 250.

[34] M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1968) op. cit., p. 429.

[35] F. NIETZCHE (1883-5) Of the despisers of the body, in: Thus Spake Zarathustra (London, Penguin:

Classics 1969).

[36] For a more detailed discussion of the issues in this article see: M. E. WHITEHEAD (1987) A study of the views of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty related to embodiment, and consideration of the implications of these views for the justification and practice of physical education, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University.